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ADVERSE POSSESSION AND TAKINGS                            
SELDOM COMPENSATION FOR CHANCE HAPPENINGS 
Martin J. Foncello∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The law of adverse possession is relatively settled.1  Generally, a 
trespasser’s possession of another’s property will result in a transfer of 
title if the possession was adverse, exclusive, open and notorious, and 
uninterrupted for the statutory period.2  By failing to assert the right 
to exclude within the statutory period, the true owner loses title to 
the property3 and is without claim for compensation or damages.4 
Federal takings law, on the other hand, is relatively unsettled.5  
While the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that the government must 
pay just compensation for any land taken for public purpose is 
straightforward, it has proven difficult in application.6  The Takings 
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 1 Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1122, 1122 (1984) (“The law of adverse possession tends to be regarded as 
a quiet backwater.”). 
 2 Classic legal scholarship on adverse possession is in agreement on the elements 
necessary to make out a claim.  See Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 
HARV. L. REV. 135 (1918); Henry W. Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession, 28 
YALE L.J. 219 (1918); Percy Bordwell, Mistake and Adverse Possession, 7 IOWA L. BULL. 
129 (1922); William Edwin Taylor, Actual Possession in Adverse Possession of Land, 25 
IOWA L. REV. 78 (1939); William F. Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 16 N.Y.U. L.Q. 
REV. 539 (1939) (part 1); William F. Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 17 N.Y.U. L.Q. 
REV. 44 (1939) (part 2). 
 3 Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, supra note 2, at 139. 
 4 See, e.g., Rogers v. Marlin, 754 So. 2d 1267, 1273 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (stating 
that “damages are never a part of adverse possession”). 
 5 William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and 
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 887 (1995) (stating that “takings law today 
is incoherent”). 
 6 The terms of the Fifth Amendment are some of the “most common and 
difficult terms in our legal lexicon, linked together in sentences of great power but 
of equally great abstraction.”  RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 20 (1985).  Courts have had difficulty applying these 
terms to the many complex, and even bizarre, situations possible in the modern 
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Clause has become a hotbed of the Constitution, with its panoply of 
precedent stretching and twisting to fit into the year’s new litigation, 
potentially as numerous as the regulations that invade every aspect of 
our modern life.7 
But at the point where these two legal doctrines cross, there is a 
no man’s land, void of analysis by a federal court until Pascoag 
Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island.8  In Pascoag Reservoir, the District 
Court of Rhode Island was presented with an issue that had not 
previously surfaced in federal jurisprudence.9  Pascoag Reservoir, also 
know as Echo Lake, is an artificial body of water located in the towns 
of Burrillville and Glocester, Rhode Island.10  Pascoag Reservoir & 
Dam, LLC’s predecessor in title created the lake in 1860.11  In 1964, 
 
state.  See generally Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 
327 (1922) (military battery overlooking beach resort); Village of Euclid v. Amber 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning regulations reduced value of property by 
seventy-five percent); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (military flights 
over chicken farm); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) (flooding of 
land); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (federal law requires 
disclosure of trade secret); Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988) (sheep 
killed by protected grizzly bears); Moerman v. California, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1993) (endangered elk destroyed fences and ate forage); Am. Heart Ass’n v. 
County of Greenville, 489 S.E.2d 921 (S.C. 1997) (retention by Probate Court of 
original will and signature of famous baseball player). 
 7 The most recent cases to set practitioners and the academy abuzz include: 
Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (5-4 decision) (state 
directs interest earned on funds in IOLTA accounts to legal services); Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (moratorium on 
development while environmental agency could determine impact of development 
on lake); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (state regulation preventing 
owner from developing coastal wetlands). 
 8 337 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 962 (2003). 
 9 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 217 
(D.R.I. 2002).  One student commentator has already discussed this case.  See 
Kimberly A. Selemba, Comment, The Interplay Between Property Law and Constitutional 
Law: How the Government (Un)Constitutionally “Takes” Land Dirt Cheap, 108 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 657 (2003).  Selemba’s Comment directly follows the reasoning of the district 
court.  See id. at 664-75.  Selemba describes the issues, but does not bring theory to 
bear.  This Comment, on the other hand, explores the theoretical underpinnings of 
the requirement of just compensation and analyzes other issues not thoroughly 
explored by the district court.  Such issues include: whether the takings claim accrues 
from the moment of actual entry or when title is vested in the adverse possessor, 
whether requiring compensation by the government would undermine the 
justifications for adverse possession, and whether adverse possession is a background 
principle of state property law. 
 10 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 90. 
 11 Id. 
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the State of Rhode Island purchased a lot abutting the reservoir.12  
One year later, the state constructed a boat ramp, whose supports 
extended into the company’s property.13  Community members used 
the boat ramp to access the lake.14  This use went uninterrupted until 
1997, when after several years of failed negotiations between the 
parties for the sale of the lake, Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC 
erected a “No Trespassing” sign at the water’s edge, trying to limit the 
public’s use of the water.15  The State then brought suit in state court 
seeking to quiet title to the land via a theory of uninterrupted adverse 
possession.16  In 2001, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that 
the state had acquired the part of the lake bottom under the boat 
ramp by adverse possession and had acquired a prescriptive easement 
for the public to use the boat ramp to access the lake.17 
In 2002, Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC brought suit in federal 
court seeking just compensation.18  The district court held that, 
although the state’s acquisition of a fee simple in land through 
adverse possession is a taking,19 the federal takings claim must be 
dismissed because the company failed to pursue the available state 
remedy in a timely fashion.20  Alternatively, the court held that the 
company’s twenty-six year delay in bringing suit was unreasonable 
and that the claim was barred by the doctrine of laches.21 
In 2003, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of the claim22 without passing upon the 
constitutional question of whether adverse possession by the 
government is a compensable taking.23  The First Circuit concluded 
 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 90. 
 17 Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC, 774 A.2d 826, 838 (R.I. 2001) (3-2 
decision). 
 18 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
 19 Id. at 222. 
 20 Id. at 228. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam,  337 F.3d at 90. 
 23 Id.  The First Circuit followed the fundamental notion of judicial restraint 
where constitutional questions are not answered in absence of their exigency.  For 
support of this principle of judicial restraint, see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 446 (1988); Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold 
Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157-58 (1984); Leroy v. Great W. 
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 181 (1979); Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U.S. 322, 323 
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that even if such a claim were viable, the company failed to bring the 
state claim for compensation in a timely fashion and its federal 
takings claim was therefore forfeited.24 
This Comment will attempt to steer a path through this “curious 
juncture between property law and constitutional law”25 and answer 
the question unresolved by the First Circuit in Pascoag Reservoir: Does 
a governmental actor’s acquisition of land by adverse possession give 
rise to a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment?26  This 
Comment will assert that the government must pay just compensation 
for land acquired through adverse possession.  The underlying 
rationales for both adverse possession and the constitutional 
prohibition on takings without just compensation compel such a 
result. 
In Part I, this Comment will examine the different methods 
through which a governmental actor can acquire land, such as 
condemnation and prescription, and the constitutional limits on 
each method.  Part II will employ the district court’s opinion in 
Pascoag Reservoir as a portal through which to explore the 
constitutional argument that the government’s physical invasion of 
private property for the statutory period is a taking.  The Comment 
will contrast the decisions of the district court in Pascoag Reservoir with 
the few state courts that have addressed whether adverse possession 
by the government is a compensable taking.  In addition, the 
Comment will demonstrate the merits of the district court’s position 
by providing a detailed analysis of the statutes of limitation on the 
remedies available to the true owner for the government’s physical 
invasion.  In Part III, it will then allay the potential concerns of some 
commentators by illustrating that requiring the government to 
compensate for land taken by adverse possession would not 
undermine the rationales underlying the doctrine.  Recalling the 
four justifications of adverse possession that were put forth by 
Professor Thomas Merrill in his classic article, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Adverse Possession,27 the Comment will argue that both the 
eminent domain power and the statute of limitation for the takings 
claim will minimize the impact that the compensation requirement 
 
(1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972); Burton v. United States, 
196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905). 
 24 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 96. 
 25 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
 26 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 90. 
 27 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1128-32. 
  
2005 COMMENT 671 
 
 
has on these rationales.  Finally, in Part IV it will argue that the 
Takings Clause is a fundamental limitation on government 
overreaching and that the government cannot evade this obligation 
by virtue of adverse possession.28  The government is not exempt from 
paying compensation in this context because adverse possession does 
not fall within the narrow reach of the “background principles of 
state property law” exception announced by the Supreme Court in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.29 
I. METHODS THROUGH WHICH THE GOVERNMENT MAY ACQUIRE 
PRIVATE LAND AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS 
There are multiple methods through which the government can 
acquire property from a private landowner.  The first of these 
methods, condemnation, deals with: (1) the express taking of land 
through exercise of the power of eminent domain; and (2) inverse 
condemnation, where in absence of the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain, the state takes land through physical appropriation 
or excessive regulation.30  The second method by which the 
government can acquire land is through the doctrine of adverse uses.  
Under this doctrine, the government may acquire land by adverse 
possession and prescriptive easement—property rights that, in many 
respects, are equivalent in form and substance.31 
I-A. Eminent Domain 
Eminent domain is the right of the sovereign, as the ultimate 
owner of all real property, to recall private land for public purposes.32  
The origin of the sovereign’s right to acquire title to private property 
by condemnation antedates constitutions and legislative enactments.33  
This right is “an incident to sovereignty, inherent in and belonging to 
every sovereign state.”34  The power of eminent domain is said to be 
 
 28 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 226 (noting that “[t]he 
government cannot escape the Takings Clause by opting to sit by until title is 
transferred to it”). 
 29 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 30 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322 n.17. 
 31 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1124 (characterizing prescription as “a first cousin of 
adverse possession”). 
 32 Haig v. Wateree Power Co., 112 S.E. 55, 57 (S.C. 1922). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Johnston v. Alabama Public Serv. Comm’n, 252 So. 2d 75, 76 (Ala. 1971) (per 
curiam). 
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“one of the unwritten laws of all civilized nations.”35 
The power of eminent domain is a product of political 
necessity.36  The sovereign would find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
construct highways, bridges, sewers, waterlines, or any other public 
necessities that may arise, without the power of eminent domain.37  It 
would be difficult for the government to piece together enough 
voluntary transactions to complete one of these projects.38  The high 
transaction costs associated with trying to find the landowners and 
then to successfully negotiate a fair price may deter progress and 
frustrate public goals.39  The government can bypass these difficulties 
by exercising the right of eminent domain.40 
Although the power of eminent domain is a basic element of 
sovereignty,41 it is not without limitation.  The Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment limits the federal government’s ability to divest a 
landowner of property.  The Fifth Amendment states, “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”42  The Takings Clause is incorporated into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore applies 
to the states.43 
The “public use” limitation prescribes that the government may 
not take land for whatever purpose it pleases, but may only take for a 
public purpose.44  While sound in theory, this limitation is rather 
porous due to the Supreme Court’s formulation of a loose standard 
to determine which acts purportedly take land for a public purpose.45  
For the taking to be considered for a public use, there must be a 
“rational relationship to some conceivable public purpose.”46  One 
 
 35 Haig, 112 S.E. at 57. 
 36 United States v. 4,450.72 Acres of Land, 27 F. Supp. 167, 172 (D. Minn. 1939) 
(quoting Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875)). 
 37 See EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 3-6. 
 38 Id. 
 39 It is the potential for “hold outs” that drives up the transaction costs.  Id.  
Eminent domain eliminates the problem of the one uncooperative landowner who 
seeks to improve his bargaining position.  Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 80.01(b)(1) (David A. Thomas ed., 1999). 
 42 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 43 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 44 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 45 See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-45 (1984) (“The Court 
long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use 
for the general public.”). 
 46 Montgomery v. Carter County, 226 F.3d 758, 765 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal 
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court astutely pointed out that few takings would fail to meet this 
standard.47  Furthermore, the reviewing court will show deference to 
the legislative decision as to what constitutes a public use unless the 
use is without reasonable foundation.48 
The second limitation, the payment of “just compensation,” is a 
fundamental limitation on the actions of the state.49  It is well 
established that, “[t]he power to take and the obligation to indemnify 
for the taking are inseparable.”50  The owner should be fully 
indemnified for the loss sustained when his property is taken for 
public use.51  The private landowner is compensated for the loss 
suffered to him, not the benefit gained by the government.52 
I-B. Inverse Condemnation 
Inverse condemnation is defined as “a cause of action against a 
 
quotation marks omitted) (discussing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 
(1984)). 
 47 Id. at 765-66. 
 48 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.  Some commentators have questioned whether courts 
have given municipalities too much deference allowing condemnations for purposes 
seemingly tangential to a public use and whether a “more rigorous standard” is 
required.  See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., LAND USE 294 (4th ed. 2004).  The Supreme 
Court recently granted certiorari in Kelo v. City of New London, 73 U.S.L.W. 3178 
(Sept. 28, 2004) (No. 04-108), raising speculation that the deferential public use 
standard expressed in Midkiff will be reevaluated.  In Kelo, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court upheld the city’s condemnation of private residences where the land was to be 
developed pursuant to an economic development plan that aimed to compliment 
the expansion of a local pharmaceutical company’s facilities.  Kelo v. City of New 
Haven, 843 A.2d 500, 507-08 (Conn. 2004).  The Connecticut court held that the 
exercise of eminent domain power to “promote municipal economic development 
by creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues, otherwise revitalizing 
distressed urban areas, constituted a valid public use.”  Id. at 531. 
 49 As Justice Holmes cautioned, “[w]e are in danger of forgetting that a strong 
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the 
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”  Penn. 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
 50 Drury v. Midland R. Co., 127 Mass. 571, 576 (1879). 
 51 It can be difficult to determine the value of what is taken.  As Justice Brandeis 
stated, “[v]alue is a word of many meanings.”  Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n of Missouri, 262 U.S. 276, 310 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, the Court examined a claim for 
compensation to a laundry service company for the government’s temporary use and 
occupancy of the laundry service for servicemen.  338 U.S. 1 (1949).  Justice 
Frankfurter noted that to fix the amount of compensation requires a well informed 
“guess” as to what the property owner would have received in a voluntary exchange.  
Id. at 5-6. 
 52 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910) (Holmes, 
J.) (“[T]he question is, What has the Owner lost? not, What has the taker gained?”). 
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governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has 
been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no 
formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted 
by the taking agency.”53  The two situations where the government 
may take property include: (1) the physical appropriations of 
property for public use; and (2) restrictions on uses of property 
which are so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation.54 
To determine the type of taking that is implicated, one must 
focus on the character of the government invasion.55  When the 
government physically appropriates land, the finding of a taking is 
fairly obvious.56  Indeed, the Supreme Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corporation57 announced a categorical rule to 
determine when a taking has occurred.  The Court held that 
governmental action that can be fairly characterized as a permanent 
physical occupation of property is a taking.58 
A taking is not self-evident, however, when the owner contends 
that a law or regulation so severely restricts the use of the land as to 
amount to a taking.59  The analysis is much more complex.60  The 
logical starting point of regulatory taking analysis is Justice Holmes’ 
oft-quoted statement that, “if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”61  For more than eighty years, the Court has 
been trying to come up with a formulation to identify those 
regulations that go “too far.”62 
 
 53 United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (quoting D. HAGMAN, URBAN 
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328 (1971)) (internal quotations 
omitted) (Court’s emphasis omitted). 
 54 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322 n.17. 
 55 See generally id. at 324-25. 
 56 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (“The clearest sort of taking occurs when the 
government encroaches upon or occupies private land for its own proposed use.”). 
 57 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 58 Id. at 434-35.  The rule announced by the Court in Loretto was not surprising.  
See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).  Michelman 
noted that, “[t]he one incontestable case for compensation” is where the 
government “regularly” uses or “permanently” occupies land under private 
ownership.  Id. at 1184.  Further he noted that, “courts never deny compensation for 
a physical takeover.”  Id. 
 59 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322 n.17. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Penn. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415. 
 62 Id. 
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In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,63 the Court announced 
a second categorical rule defining one instance where a regulation 
has gone “too far.”  The Court held that “when the owner of real 
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial 
uses in the name of the common good, . . . he has suffered a 
taking.”64  The Lucas rule only applies to regulations that deprive the 
landowner of all economically beneficial uses of the land.  
Regulations whose impact comes short of a “complete elimination in 
value,” or a “total loss,” require analysis under the Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York balancing test.65 
Under the Penn Central balancing test, the court will engage in 
“ad hoc, factual inquiries” to determine if there has been a regulatory 
taking.66  Factors the court will consider include “the economic 
impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-
backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.”67 
 
 63 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 64 Id. at 1019. 
 65 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 330 (referring to the balancing test 
announced in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)). 
 66 Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 67 Id.  The reader should note that this Comment does not provide an in-depth 
look at federal takings jurisprudence.  This is a pragmatic decision reflecting the 
desire not to wade into murky water unnecessarily.  While this Comment will briefly 
look at regulatory takings, the focus of the discussion will be on physical takings, 
which are implicated when the state acquires land by prescription.  A snapshot of 
academic critiques of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence should support this 
Comment’s limited endeavor.  See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1977) (existing case-law is “but a chaos of confused 
argument”); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 955, 966 (1993) 
(takings test is “so amorphous as to defy description”); Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the 
Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 147 (1995) 
(many view takings cases as “incoherent, piecemeal, or categorical”); James E. Krier, 
The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1997) (“law in this area 
is a bewildering mess”); Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct “Spin” on Lucas, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1432 (1993) (the Court has failed “to develop a coherent, 
consistent framework for takings analysis”); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: 
In Search of Underlying Principles Part I – A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 
CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1304 (1989) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a body of case law in 
greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray.”); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police 
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964) (this area of law is best characterized as “a welter of 
confusing and apparently incompatible results”); William Michael Treanor, The 
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
782, 887 (1995) (“takings law is plagued by fundamental disagreements”).  Cf. Marc 
R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 93 
(2002) (embracing the vagueness in takings doctrine as both “quite functional and 
entirely appropriate”). 
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I-C. Adverse Possession and Prescriptive Easement 
Adverse possession is a possession of land that is inconsistent 
with the right of the true owner.68  When the possession is 
accompanied by specific acts, the title will vest in the adverse 
possessor.69  To establish title by adverse possession, the trespasser’s 
possession must be actual, open and notorious, adverse, exclusive, 
under a claim of right, and continuous for the statutory period.70 
An easement is an interest in land granting to one individual the 
right to use and enjoy another’s land.71  Unlike an express easement, 
where the owner of the dominant estate has been granted the right to 
use the servient estate,72 a prescriptive easement is implied from an 
individual’s open, adverse, and continuous use of the land for the 
statutory period.73 
Although a prescriptive easement bears many similarities to 
adverse possession,74 there are two significant differences.  First, the 
elements necessary to create a prescriptive easement mirror those of 
an adverse possession claim75 except for the exclusivity requirement.76  
 
 68 Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, supra note 2, at 219. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Caselaw from different jurisdictions shows the general uniformity of the 
elements of adverse possession.  See Bonds v. Carter, 75 S.W.3d 192, 198 (Ark. 2002); 
Hennessy v. Fairley, 796 A.2d 41, 49 (Me. 2002); Totman v. Malloy, 725 N.E.2d 1045, 
1047 (Mass. 2000); Habel v. James, 68 P.3d 743, 746 (Mont. 2003); Nye v. Fire Group 
P’ship, 657 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Neb. 2003); Greubele v. Geringer, 640 N.W.2d 454, 457 
(N.D. 2002); Francis v. Rogers, 40 P.3d 481, 485 (Okla. 2001); Lewis v. Aslesen, 635 
N.W.2d 744, 746 (S.D. 2001); MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells, 834 A.2d 
25, 35 (Vt. 2003); Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Wyo. 2000). 
 71 Commercial Wharf East Condominium Ass’n v. Waterfront Parking Corp., 552 
N.E.2d 66, 73 (Mass. 1990).  See Morrill v. Mackman, 24 Mich. 279 (1872); Alban v. R. 
K. Co., 239 N.E.2d 22 (Ohio 1968); Brown v. Haley, 355 S.E.2d 563 (Va. 1987). 
 72 See Yeager v. Tuning, 86 N.E. 657, 658 (Ohio 1908). 
 73 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (7th ed. 1999). 
 74 William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Outlaws of the Past: A Western 
Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 79, 88 
(1996). 
 75 Beach v. City of Fairbury, 301 N.W.2d 584, 586 (Neb. 1981). 
 76 Jurisdictions differ to the extent they require exclusiveness as an element of 
prescription.  Some states do not require it at all.  See Neyland v. Hunter, 668 S.W.2d 
530, 531 (Ark. 1984); Shellow v. Hagen, 101 N.W.2d 694, 697 (Wis. 1960).  Those 
states that do retain the requirement of exclusiveness employ it in a less meaningful 
fashion than in the adverse possession context.  They define exclusivity in this 
context, not as a showing that only the claimant made use of the land, but that the 
claimant’s use “does not depend on a like right in others.”  Schmidt v. Brown, 80 
N.E. 1071, 1074 (Ill. 1907).  See also Dena Cohen, Note, Exclusiveness in the Law of 
Prescription, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 611 (1987) (discussing the different approaches to the 
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Exclusivity is not possible in a claim for a prescriptive easement 
because the owners of the dominant and servient estate may both use 
the land simultaneously.77  A second difference between adverse 
possession and a prescriptive easement is the property right that 
results from each claim.78  Adverse possession converts the trespasser’s 
uninterrupted possession into actual title to the property.79  
Prescription, on the other hand, only gives rise to a limited right to 
use property in a way as defined by the adverse use.80 
While the doctrines of adverse possession and prescriptive 
easement are commonly thought of in the context of private actors, 
the state, and its political subdivisions, can acquire land through such 
means.81  The elements required to acquire land by adverse 
possession are the same for a governmental entity as for a private 
individual.82  Generally, for private ouster, the adverse possessor is not 
required to compensate the former owner for acquiring her 
property.83  Therefore, any requirement for the state actor to 
compensate for land acquired by adverse possession must come from 
a source other than the common law.  This Comment argues that the 
 
exclusive requirement courts have adopted and advocating that this requirement be 
dropped from the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement). 
 77 Cohen, supra note 76, at 627-28; see also Phillips v. Bonadies, 136 A. 684, 686 
(Conn. 1927) (“[U]ser may be exclusive, though it was participated in by owner of 
servient tenement.”); Cramer v. Jenkins, 399 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Mo. 1966) (stating there 
is no requirement that “the user must prevent the owner of the land from using it”). 
 78 Ackerman & Johnson, supra note 74, at 88. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 A. M. Vann, Annotation, Acquisition of Title to Land by Adverse Possession by State 
or Other Governmental Unit or Agency, 18 A.L.R.3d 678 (1968).  Representative decisions 
agreeing with the principle that the state may take land by adverse possession 
include: Roche v. Town of Fairfield, 442 A.2d 911 (Conn. 1982); State v. Hays, 785 
P.2d 1356 (Kan. 1990); Daley v. Town of Swampscott, 421 N.E.2d 78 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1981); Granite County v. Komberec, 800 P.2d 166 (Mont. 1990); Reitsma v. Pascoag 
Reservoir & Dam, LLC, 774 A.2d 826 (R.I. 2001); Koontz v. Town of Superior, 746 
P.2d 1264 (Wyo. 1987).  But see Regard v. Escude, 69 So. 2d 627, 629 (La. Ct. App. 
1953) (holding that a “municipality cannot acquire property by prescription”).  
Subsequent history of this decision raises the question of whether this is still a valid 
statement of law after substantial amendments were made to the Louisiana state 
constitution.  Parish of Jefferson v. Bonnabel Prop., Inc., 620 So. 2d 1168 (La. 1993). 
 82 A. M. Vann, supra note 81, at 678; see Williams v. North Carolina State Bd. of 
Educ., 147 S.E.2d 381 (N.C. 1966); State v. Vanderkoppel, 19 P.2d 955 (Wyo. 1933). 
 83 But see Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 584, 591-94 (Cal. 
1984) (Reynoso, J., dissenting) (asserting he would affirm the court of appeals 
decision requiring the bad faith possessor of a prescriptive easement to compensate 
for the fair market value of the easement). 
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Fifth Amendment mandates that the government compensate for any 
land it acquires through adverse possession. 
II. ADVERSE POSSESSION BY THE GOVERNMENT                                                 
IS A COMPENSABLE TAKING 
In Pascoag Reservoir, the District Court of Rhode Island became 
the first federal court to address whether adverse possession by the 
government gives rise to a compensable taking.84  It correctly ruled in 
the affirmative.  The district court surveyed the few state court 
decisions that had addressed this issue.85  These state courts have held 
the contrary, finding that: (1) no taking has occurred, therefore no 
compensation is warranted;86 (2) a taking has occurred but the claim 
for just compensation is time-barred due to the passing of the statute 
of limitations for the prescriptive period;87 or (3) that compensation 
is never a part of adverse possession cases.88  As the district court 
pointed out, these decisions are fundamentally flawed for two 
reasons.89 
First, many of these courts erroneously rely on Texaco, Inc. v. 
Short90 for the proposition that land acquired by a governmental entity 
through adverse possession is not subject to a takings claim.91  As the 
district court astutely observed, the Texaco decision does not stand for 
this proposition.92  In fact, the case is not even about adverse 
 
 84 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 217. 
 85 Id. at 223-24. 
 86 The Ohio Supreme Court held that after the statutory period for adverse 
possession is completed the true owner no longer has title.  State ex rel. A.A.A. Inv. v. 
City of Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ohio 1985) (per curiam).  Thereafter, the 
state is simply maintaining its possession and can no longer be said to be taking 
property.  Id.  See Bd. of County of Comm’rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1984); 
Commonwealth v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1966); Dunnick v. Stockgrowers 
Bank of Marmouth, 215 N.W.2d 93 (Neb. 1974). 
 87 See Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1993); Stickney v. City of Saco, 770 
A.2d 592 (Me. 2001). 
 88 See Rogers v. Marlin, 754 So. 2d 1267 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Krambeck v. City of 
Gretna, 254 N.W.2d 691 (Neb. 1977); Algermissen v. Sutin, 61 P.3d 176 (N.M. 2002); 
City of Ashland v. Hardesty, 543 P.2d 41 (Or. 1975); Peterson v. Port of Seattle, 618 
P.2d 67 (Wash. 1980); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 348 P.2d 664 (Wash. 1960). 
 89 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 224-25. 
 90 454 U.S. 516 (1982). 
 91 One state court even went so far as to characterize the case before it as “not 
analytically distinguishable from Texaco.”  Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 984.  See also State ex 
rel. A.A.A. Inv., 478 N.E.2d at 775 (listing other authorities, which predate the Texaco 
decision, but are consistent with the reasoning in that case). 
 92 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 224.  The district court made this 
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possession.93 
In Texaco, a landowner challenged the Indiana Dormant Mineral 
Interests Act (or “Mineral Lapse Act”) as a taking.94  The act provided 
that, unless the owner filed a claim in the county recorder’s office, 
severed mineral interests that had been unused for more than 20 
years would be deemed to have been abandoned and would revert to 
the surface owner.95  The United States Supreme Court found that 
this was not an impermissible taking.96  In oft-quoted language, the 
Court stated that, “[i]t is the owner’s failure to make any use of the 
property—and not the action of the State—that causes the lapse of 
the property right.”97  After abandoning the property, “the former 
owner retains no interest for which he may claim compensation.”98 
Relying upon the broad language in Texaco, some courts have 
held that the state is not taking property in an adverse possession 
case, but it is actually the failure of the true owner to make use of the 
property that has caused the property right to lapse.99  These courts 
have apparently seized upon some of the Supreme Court’s words, 
while ignoring others.  The focus is on the “owner’s failure to make 
any use of the property.”100  In the instance of adverse possession, it is 
accurate to say that the true owner’s failure to inspect the property 
and to exercise the right to exclude has contributed to the loss of the 
property right.  But the true owner’s inaction alone is not sufficient 
for the transfer of the property right.  The adverse possessor’s 
affirmative acts must factor into this equation.101 
The circumstances in Texaco and Pascoag Reservoir are similar in 
that there is extended inaction by the true owner, but are different in 
an important sense.  In Texaco, the state is not a trespasser.102  The 
often-neglected language in Texaco is that the transfer of the property 
 
astute observation. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Texaco, Inc., 454 U.S. at 522. 
 95 Id. at 521. 
 96 Id. at 530. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See, e.g., Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 984; State ex rel. A.A.A. Inv., 478 N.E.2d at 775. 
 100 Texaco, 454 U.S. at 530. 
 101 To make out a claim for adverse possession, the trespasser’s possession must be 
actual, open and notorious, exclusive, adverse, under a claim of right, and 
continuous for the statutory period.  Taylor, supra note 2, at 78. 
 102 Texaco is not about adverse possession, but an alleged regulatory taking.  See 
Texaco, 454 U.S. at 530. 
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right under the Mineral Lapse Act is not due to an “action of the 
State.”103  On the other hand, in Pascoag Reservoir, the State of Rhode 
Island is the adverse possessor.104  The state has actually acquired title 
by claiming ownership to the reservoir and using it in a way that is 
inconsistent with that of the true owner, continuously for the 
statutory period.105  This is a clear situation of the government’s actual 
ouster of a private landowner. 
Critique of the state court decisions does not end with 
highlighting their erroneous reliance on Texaco.  The district court in 
Pascoag Reservoir observed that, to hold—as a number of state courts 
had106—that the true owner’s takings claim is time-barred after the 
statutory period for adverse possession is completed, misstates what is 
transpiring in adverse possession cases.107  The state courts have 
mechanically applied the adverse possession doctrine without regard 
to the constitutional implications of the government’s physical 
invasion of private property for the statutory period—an invasion 
which falls within the confines of a per se takings rule.108  An 
examination of the statutes of limitation for the various remedies 
available to the true owner for a physical invasion by the government 
(i.e., trespass, ejection, and takings) illustrates that the district court’s 
holding is analytically sound. 
Generally, the statute of limitations for a takings claim against 
the federal government is six years.109  Seeing as there is no federal 
statute of limitations for a takings claim against a state government, a 
federal district court faced with such a situation will “adopt the 
analogous state statute of limitations.”110  A takings claim is said to 
“sound[] in tort” and, therefore, the particular jurisdiction’s statute 
of limitations for trespass or personal injury is usually applied.111 
For purposes of illustration, assume—as the state courts 
 
 103 Id. 
 104 Reitsma, 774 A.2d at 829. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Weidner, 860 P.2d at 1212; Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 984; Stephens, 407 S.W.2d at 
712; Stickney, 770 A.2d at 603; Dunnick, 215 N.W.2d at 96; State ex rel. A.A.A. Inv., 478 
N.E.2d at 775. 
 107 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 224. 
 108 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441 (holding that “a permanent physical occupation of 
property is a taking.”). 
 109 Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (West 2004). 
 110 Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 587 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 111 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 711 
(1999). 
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apparently did—that the takings claim begins to accrue at the 
moment that the government first comes into physical occupation of 
the land, the moment of actual entry.  Imagine the Catch 22 situation 
faced by a true owner in a jurisdiction with a two-year statute of 
limitations for an action for trespass—and therefore a two-year statute 
of limitations for a takings claim against the government—but a ten-
year statute of limitations for an action for ejectment.  The true 
owner’s takings claim would effectively expire on year two, eight years 
prior to the property right having actually been taken by the adverse 
possessor.  This result can hardly be considered a logical 
reconciliation of the adverse possession and takings doctrines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instead, the true owner’s takings claim should not begin to 
accrue until the title vests in the adverse possessor, the moment the 
true owner’s action for ejectment has expired.112  Using this moment 
as the accrual point would accommodate both the adverse possession 
and takings doctrines and afford the true owner all remedies 
available at law.  For example, if the true owner were to file suit 
before year ten, he would eject the government intruder and recover 
 
 112 In the Pascoag Reservoir opinion, District Court Judge Lagueux astutely pointed 
out that the original owner cannot bring a takings suit until the prescriptive period 
has expired, because it is not until the period expires that the adverse possessor can 
show a right in the property.  Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 224.  Prior 
to that point, the landowner’s remedies included an action for ejectment and 
damages for trespass.  Id. 
Diagram 1: Takings claim accrues at the moment of actual entry 
 
SOL for action for trespass (taking) = 2 years 
SOL for action for ejectment (adverse possession) = 10 years 
 
Year 0 
 
Actual Entry; 
Takings Claim 
accrues 
Year 2 
 
Takings 
Claim 
expires 
Year 10 
 
Action for Ejectment 
expires; State 
acquires land by AP 
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some measure of damages for the temporary invasion.113  On year ten, 
the true owner’s action for ejectment would expire and the 
government would take title to the land by adverse possession.  The 
true owner would then have until year twelve to seek compensation 
for the permanent taking.  Any claim brought after year twelve would 
be time-barred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A brief survey of the elements of a federal cause of action for a 
taking will prove the accuracy of this analysis.  The Supreme Court in 
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank114 
stated two prerequisites that must be met before the takings claim is 
ripe for federal review.  First, the governmental entity charged with 
implementing the regulations must have reached a final decision 
regarding the application of the regulations to the property in 
question.115  This is the “final decision requirement.”116  Also, the 
landowner must have sought, and been denied, just compensation by 
means of an adequate state procedure.117  This is the “state action 
requirement.”118  Decisions by lower courts have indicated that the 
 
 113 If the adverse possession claim is terminated prematurely, regardless of 
whether the government chose to abandon its adverse possession claim or the true 
owner brought suit to eject, the government must compensate for the temporary 
invasion.  See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
 114 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
 115 Id. at 193. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Inadequacy, unavailability, and the futility of seeking the state remedy have 
Diagram 2: Takings claim accrues at the moment the action for ejectment expires 
 
SOL for action for trespass (taking) = 2 years 
SOL for action for ejectment (adverse possession) = 10 years 
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“final decision” requirement is relaxed in physical occupation cases.119 
Even with the relaxed “final decision” requirement, a landowner 
who is subjected to a physical invasion cannot bring a federal takings 
claim if the landowner does not pursue the available state remedy for 
compensation in a timely fashion.120  The timeliness of a state claim 
for compensation depends on when the taking actually occurs.  For 
physical takings, the inquiry is this: at what point does the 
government’s physical invasion change in character and nature from 
a trespass to a permanent physical occupation?  Central to this 
inquiry is identifying the point where the invasion shifts from a 
temporary limitation on the owner’s right to exclude to a permanent 
extinguishment of that owner’s right. 
The Supreme Court in Loretto laid down the categorical rule that 
permanent physical occupations are a compensable taking.121  Writing 
for the Court, Justice Marshall attempted to make the distinction 
between temporary and permanent takings.  The Justice noted that, 
while every physical invasion is not a taking, it is the “permanence 
and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation” that distinguishes it 
from a temporary limitation.122  An owner’s property rights in a 
physical thing include the right to possess, use, and dispose of the 
 
been recognized as exceptions to this Williamson “state action requirement.”  Pascoag 
Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 92. 
 119 See id. at 91; Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1282 n.28 (9th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988).  The Williamson court only provided a 
framework for regulatory taking cases.  Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 185. 
 120 See Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 150 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(finding the landowner’s “failure to seek recompense through Puerto Rico’s inverse 
condemnation remedy renders both his takings and substantive due process claims 
unripe for federal adjudication”); Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 
380 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding federal takings “claim is not yet ripe for review” because 
of developer’s failure to seek state remedy); Stern v. Halligan, 158 F.3d 729, 734 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (stating that the landowners have not “sought compensation through state 
proceedings . . . [and their] takings claim must be rejected”); Gamble v. Eau Claire 
County, 5 F.3d 285, 286 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that “[b]y booting her state 
compensation remedies [the landowner] forfeited any claim based on the takings 
clause to just compensation”); Austin v. City & County of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678, 
680 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that landowner’s “claim is not ripe for review in federal 
court because he failed to seek compensation through adequate state remedies”). 
 121 “[W]hen the character of the governmental action is a permanent physical 
occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the 
occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public 
benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.”  Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-
35 (citations omitted). 
 122 Id. at 436 n.12. 
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property in an exclusive and unfettered manner.123  When the 
government permanently occupies physical property, it destroys each 
of these rights.124  The owner, then, can no longer put the land to use 
and is without the power to exclude the intruder.125 
Central to Justice Marshall’s distinction between temporary and 
permanent occupations is the true owner’s right to exclude others 
from his property.  Traditionally, the power to exclude has been 
hailed as “one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of 
property rights.”126  The Court has consistently held that the owner’s 
right to exclude is an interest that the state cannot take without 
compensation.127  While there are some line-drawing problems at the 
boundary of the rule, it is clear that the government’s invasion will be 
treated as a permanent physical occupation when the result is to 
terminate the private owner’s power to exclude.128 
This understanding of the distinction between a temporary and 
permanent physical occupation can be applied to cases of adverse 
possession by the government.  While the trespasser’s unwanted 
presence interferes with the true owner’s right to use and dispose of 
the property, it does not interfere with the right to exclude.129  The 
true owner retains this right until the prescriptive period passes.130  
The original owner’s right to exclude is terminated at the point when 
the statute of limitations on the action for ejectment expires.131  It is at 
this point that the government’s exclusion is properly found to be a 
 
 123 Id. at 435. 
 124 Id.  In more metaphorical terms, Justice Marshall noted that, through physical 
occupation “the government does not simply take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ 
of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.”  Id. 
 125 Id. at 436. 
 126 Id. at 435.  See also Int’l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 
(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that “[a]n essential element of individual 
property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it”). 
 127 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding “that the 
‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property 
right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without 
compensation”). 
 128 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37.  One commentator noted that it appears as if the 
Court recognized an exception to the physical invasion rule in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987), by stating that a permanent physical 
occupation, that would otherwise be a taking, might be justified as a condition of 
securing a land use or development permit.  CALLIES, LAND USE, supra note 48, at 
305. 
 129 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 126 (5th ed. 2002). 
 130 See id. 
 131 See id. 
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permanent physical occupation within the meaning of Loretto.  
Therefore, the true owner’s state claim for compensation should not 
accrue until title vests in the adverse possessor.132 
This discussion should illustrate the logical failings of the state 
court decisions that held a claim for compensation expires with the 
passing of the prescriptive period.133  The takings claim is, most 
likely,134 not cognizable until the extinguishment of the true owner’s 
 
 132 In the principal case, Pascoag Reservoir, LLC argued that the takings claim did 
not accrue until the Supreme Court of Rhode Island unequivocally declared that the 
state had acquired title by adverse possession.  See Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d 
at 95; see also Brief for Petitioner Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC at 14-16, Pascoag 
Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 72 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2003) (No. 
03-597).  To support this position, Pascoag Reservoir, LLC cited United States v. 
Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947), a case that involved the intermittent flooding of an 
individual’s property.  Writing for the Court in Dickinson, Justice Frankfurter noted 
that the Government, by condemnation, could have “fixed” the time when the 
property was taken, but instead left the taking up to physical events.  331 U.S. at 747-
48.  This puts the “onus” on the landowner to determine the decisive moment when 
there is no question that the government has confiscated the property.  Id. at 748.  
Acknowledging that a taking by flooding is a continuous process, Justice Frankfurter 
declared that suit for compensation may be delayed “until the situation becomes 
stabilized.”  Id. at 749.  The Court held that, “when the Government chooses not to 
condemn land but to bring about a taking by a continuing process of physical events, 
the owner is not required to resort to either piecemeal or premature litigation to 
ascertain just compensation for what is really ‘taken.’”  Id.  The landowner can wait 
to bring suit until the character of the government’s action is unquestionably a 
taking.  Id. 
Pascoag Reservoir, LLC maintained that it did not fail the second Williamson 
prong, the “state action” requirement.  It argued that adverse possession by the 
government was a taking by a continuous process of physical events and had not 
stabilized until the Supreme Court of Rhode Island clearly rendered title to the state 
via adverse possession.  Reitsma, 774 A.2d at 838.  The First Circuit rejected this 
argument, stating that a valid claim of adverse possession requires open and 
notorious possession by the trespasser.  Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 337 F.3d at 95.  
Therefore, the court determined that the former landowner should have been aware 
of a cognizable takings claim prior to the decision of the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court.  Id. 
 133 See Weidner v. State, 860 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1993); Stickney v. City of Saco, 770 
A.2d 592 (Me. 2001). 
 134 A permanent physical occupation may be found when other interests are 
infringed upon, even though the landowner maintains the right to exclude.  Justice 
Marshall noted that, the “deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from 
property is not, in every case, independently sufficient to establish a taking.”  Loretto, 
458 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added).  Marshall leaves open the possibility that the 
deprivation of these other rights may, in some cases, be sufficient to give rise to a 
permanent physical occupation.  Id.  The court will undertake a “more complex 
balancing process” to evaluate those physical invasions that do not totally dispose the 
owner of the right to exclude.  Id. at 436 n.12.  The balancing test that Justice 
Marshall hints at signals a possible application of the “ad hoc, factual inquiries” 
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right to exclude.  The state claim for just compensation begins to 
accrue at the moment title is vested in the adverse possessor.  
Accruing the statute of limitations for the takings claim from the 
moment of actual entry would create an anomalous situation in 
which the takings claim would expire prior the property having 
actually been taken. 
III. REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT TO COMPENSATE FOR LAND TAKEN 
BY ADVERSE POSSESSION WILL NOT UNDERMINE THE RATIONALES 
UNDERLYING THE DOCTRINE 
Some would argue that requiring the government to pay just 
compensation for land acquired by adverse possession is a sub silentio 
prohibition on adverse possession by the government.  To be clear, 
this Comment does not contest that a state may acquire land by 
adverse possession.  It is well settled in caselaw and legal scholarship 
that a state may acquire land through such means.135  Rather, this 
Comment argues that this acquisition of land creates in the true 
owner a right to compensation, a right that must be executed within 
the relevant statutory period.  Requiring the government to 
compensate in this limited context does not subvert the government’s 
right to acquire land by adverse possession.  The compensation 
requirement does not undermine the rationales behind the adverse 
possession doctrine. 
The doctrine of adverse possession appears to be an irregularity 
within our property regime given our systematic preference for 
property rights over mere possessory rights.136  Professor Thomas 
Merrill’s classic article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse 
Possession,137 sets forth the main justifications underlying the doctrine 
of adverse possession, validating its place in our property regime.  
Merrill explains that there are four justifications that support 
transferring the title to the adverse possessor after the expiration of 
the statute of limitations: the lost evidence, quieting title, sleeping 
 
described by the Court in Penn Central.  This suggests that the analysis for physical 
and regulatory takings are not mutually exclusive and that it is only those physical 
occupations that undeniably sever the landowner’s right to exclude that are easily 
resolved under Loretto’s per se rule. 
 135 See, e.g., Roche, 442 A.2d 911; Hays, 785 P.2d 1356; Daley, 421 N.E.2d 78; 
Komberec, 800 P.2d 166; Reitsma, 774 A.2d 826; Koontz, 746 P.2d 1264. 
 136 See, e.g., Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, supra note 2, at 135 (noting that 
“the doctrine apparently affords an anomalous instance of maturing a wrong into a 
right”). 
 137 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1128-32. 
  
2005 COMMENT 687 
 
 
owner, and reliance rationales.138  Merrill argues that requiring 
compensation (or indemnification) for land acquired by adverse 
possession in the context of private actors would undermine these 
rationales.  The same cannot be said when the government is the 
adverse possessor. 
The first justification, the lost evidence rationale, is reminiscent 
of the policy argument invoked in favor of statutes of limitation.139  
This is a common sense and pragmatic rationale recognizing the 
greater social benefit in repose.140  The quality and quantity of 
evidentiary material deteriorates with time and the parties will have to 
bear greater litigation expenses to find, or corroborate, evidence.141  
Of course, any resulting judicial determination based on an imperfect 
record will more likely be fraught with error.142  The adverse 
possession doctrine removes this concern by eliminating many 
remote claims.143 
The second justification for the doctrine of adverse possession is 
the quieting title rationale.144  The existence of remote claims on 
property impairs the marketability of title.145  Without the adverse 
possession mechanism, a purchaser of property would have to follow 
the chain of title to its source so as to identify any remote interests in 
the property,146 trace them to their present day successors, and then 
 
 138 Id. at 1133. 
 139 Statutes of limitation “are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts 
from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after 
memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence is lost.”  
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).  See Bd. of Regents v. 
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 
(1979); Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965). 
 140 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1128. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id.  See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.12 (6th ed. 
2003) (positing adverse possession reduces “error costs that are caused by using stale 
evidence to decide a dispute”). 
 143 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1128.  Merrill notes that with the implementation of 
the recording acts across the states and the availability of professional title surveys for 
a reasonable cost, this rationale may not be as important today as in Seventeenth 
Century England.  Id.  But the lost evidence rationale is still able to address those 
situations where a title contains errors and omissions, or public records are 
destroyed.  Id. 
 144 Henry W. Ballantine maintained that the “great purpose” of the adverse 
possession doctrine is “to quiet all titles which are openly and consistently asserted, 
to provide proof of meritorious titles, and correct errors in conveyancing.”  
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, supra note 2, at 135. 
 145 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1129. 
 146 Such interests could include “ancient easements, unextinguished spousal 
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negotiate their release.147  Adverse possession actually reduces the 
drag on the market by extinguishing many of these claims.148 
The sleeping owner rationale is the third justification for the 
adverse possession doctrine.149  Adverse possession punishes the true 
owner for engaging in poor custodial practices, or in other words, 
sleeping on his rights.150  The doctrine requires that the true owner 
periodically visit the property and assert the right to exclude.151  Like 
the quieting title rationale, this rationale has the effect of facilitating 
land transactions.152  A diligent owner’s periodic policing of the 
property will have the effect of flushing out offers for purchase.153 
The reliance rationale is the final justification for adverse 
possession.  The general policy is that the law should value the 
reliance interest the possessor develops through his or her 
longstanding possession of the property.154  Professor Merrill 
expressed the four different accounts of the reliance rationale that 
have been raised in academia.155  There is an interest in respecting 
the personal attachment that the possessor feels with the property, in 
preserving the peace, and protecting the economic reliance by both 
the possessor and third parties.156 
The first account, the property as personhood notion, focuses 
on the sense of personal attachment that one develops to the 
property in her possession.157  The adverse possessor may develop an 
attachment to the property that is critical to her identity.158  The 
 
rights, grants of future interests, unreleased mortgages or liens.”  Id. 
 147 Hold outs and other opportunistic behavior by the owners of these remote 
interests would be yet another—potentially costly—hurdle to overcome. 
 148 Id.  See also Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 UNIV. OF CHI. L. 
REV. 73, 81 (1988) (“[C]lear titles facilitate trade and minimize resource-wasting 
conflict.”). 
 149 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1130. 
 150 Id.  See also Rose, supra note 148, at 79 (noting that adverse possession is “a 
wonderful example of reward to useful labor, at the expense of the sluggard”). 
 151 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1130. 
 152 Id. at 1130-31. 
 153 This is for the obvious reason that it is tough to purchase land from an absent 
owner.  Id. at 1130. 
 154 Id. at 1131. 
 155 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1131. 
 156 Id. at 1131-32. 
 157 Id. at 1131. 
 158 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982) 
(explaining that “[t]he premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to 
achieve proper self-development . . . an individual needs some control over resources 
in the external environment”). 
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second account, the preserving the peace notion, coincides with the 
property as personhood argument.  The idea is that after lengthy 
occupation, the adverse possessor will become attached to the 
property and any subsequent attempt to vanquish the adverse 
possessor will result in violence. 159  The third account, the notion of 
sunk costs or quasi rents, looks at the economic reliance of the 
adverse possessor.160  An adverse possessor who has made 
improvements on the land is in an inferior bargaining position in any 
future negotiations to buy the property.161  This results from the 
common law doctrine of accession, where a property owner has the 
right to any improvements made to his land.162  Had negotiations 
taken place before the adverse possessor had made such 
improvements, the true owner would only be able to extract fair 
market value for the land.163  But in any negotiations subsequent to 
the improvements, the true owner can seek more, putting the adverse 
possessor in the position of anteing up in order to preserve his 
investment in the land.164  The final account of the reliance rationale 
 
 159 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 
(1897) (“A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, 
whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away 
without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by 
it.”).  The preserving the peace rationale has been expressed in landlord-tenant law 
with regard to a landlord’s self-help for a tenant in breach who fails to abandon or 
surrender the premises.  The common law rule was that a landlord may retake the 
premises from the tenant in possession if the landlord is legally entitled to possession 
and the means of reentry are peaceable.  Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 
1978).  See also Wilder v. House, 48 Ill. 279, 279 (1868) (landlord has “no right to 
resort to force”); Stone v. Lahey, 133 Mass. 426, 427 (1882) (may remove tenant 
without using “unreasonable force”); Rich v. Keyser, 54 Pa. 86, 86 (1867) (may retake 
property if “done without breach of the peace”).  A number of courts, fearing the 
“violent breach of peace” that may occur during landlord self-help have departed 
from the common law rule and have required the landlord to seek remedy through 
the judicial process.  Berg, 264 N.W.2d at 151 (noting that at least 16 jurisdictions 
have changed from the early common law rule). 
 160 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1131. 
 161 This is the notion of sunk costs or quasi-rents.  Id. 
 162 Accession is defined as “[a] property owner’s right to all that is added to land, 
naturally or by labor, including land left by floods and improvements made by 
another.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 13 (7th ed. 1999).  The modern trend among 
jurisdictions is to mitigate the harsh application of this doctrine by either legislative 
reform (“occupying claimant” or “betterment” acts) or judicial decisions 
emphasizing fairness to the innocent improver (Manillo v. Gorski, 54 N.J. 378 
(1969)).  DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 129, at 152-53. 
 163 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1131. 
 164 The adverse possessor must either pay the price the true owner commands or 
forfeit the improvements made on the land.  Id. at 1130. 
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looks beyond the scope of the adverse possessor/true owner dynamic 
and focuses on the economic reliance of third parties.165  There may 
be third parties, such as subsequent purchasers, with a valid interest 
in the entitlement.166  The doctrine of adverse possession protects 
these individuals who, based on the adverse possessor’s unfettered 
use of the property, have mistaken the adverse possessor for the true 
owner.167 
Professor Merrill defends the fact that title is granted to the 
adverse possessor without any liability to indemnify the true owner, 
arguing that, if required, indemnification would undermine the basis 
for this institution.168  Indemnification would require an inquiry into 
the value necessary to fairly compensate all parties who have an 
interest in the property, interfering with the lost evidence and 
quieting title rationales.169  When an individual acquires title by 
adverse possession, the title is deemed to “relate back” to the date of 
actual entry.170  So a claim for indemnification would require an 
inquiry into the value of the property on the date of actual entry.171  
Such evidence relating to the value of the property may not be 
forthcoming due to the passage of time.172  Also, the requirement of 
indemnification would result in all holders of remote or fractional 
interests in the property173 lining up to claim their share of the 
proceeds.174  Consequently, the litigation necessary to secure title by 
adverse possession would be much more expensive.175  Title insurance 
companies would accommodate this risk by raising premiums, 
 
 165 Id. at 1132. 
 166 Interested third parties could include “vendors, creditors, contractors, tenants, 
[and] subsequent purchasers.”  Id. 
 167 Id.  Public recording acts, however, are supposed to protect third parties from 
making such a mistake.  Id. 
 168 Id.  at 1126. 
 169 Id. at 1146-48. 
 170 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1147. 
 171 Id. 
 172 The prescriptive period can vary greatly depending on the jurisdiction.  See CA. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 325 (West 1982) (5 years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-30 (West 2000) 
(30 years for real estate or 60 years for woodlands and uncultivated tracts).  See J & M 
Land Co. v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 766 A.2d 1110 (N.J. 2001) (reaffirming that the 
30/60 year statute is the applicable limitations period for an adverse possession 
claim). 
 173 The interests could include: “ancient easements, unextinguished spousal 
rights, grants of future interests, unreleased mortgages or liens.”  Merrill, supra note 
1, at 1129. 
 174 Id. at 1148. 
 175 Id. 
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resulting in an additional drag on the alienability of property rights.176 
Indemnification also reduces the true owner’s incentive to assert 
the right to exclude, therefore interfering with the sleeping owner 
rationale.177  Indemnification provides less incentive for the true 
owner to adopt good custodial practices.178  What is more of an 
incentive to keep diligent custodial practices than the current 
doctrine, where a true owner who fails to bring action within the 
statutory period would lose title to the adverse possessor?179 
Finally, indemnification would undermine the reliance interests 
of adverse possessors and interested third parties “by imposing a one-
time tax on the adverse possessor equal to 100% of the market 
value.”180  The adverse possessor would be given the ultimatum to 
either pay this tax or lose the property.181  Imagine the frustration of 
third parties who reasonably relied on the adverse possessor’s 
appearance of title if the adverse possessor is unable or unwilling to 
pay this fee.182 
But the four rationales that Professor Merrill expressed are not 
undermined when the state, as the adverse possessor, is required to 
compensate the true owner.  The lost evidence, quieting title, and 
sleeping owner rationales are sustained by the statute of limitations 
for the takings claim.  As discussed in Part II, a true owner must first 
seek and be denied compensation by an adequate state procedure 
before being able to bring suit in federal court.183  Each individual 
jurisdiction will have a statute of limitation on the right to seek 
compensation.  A true owner who does not timely file this claim with 
the state fails to satisfy the Williamson County prerequisites for a 
takings claim and will be forever barred from compensation.  
Consequently, the projections of owners of remote and fractional 
interests lining up to collect their just compensation, and therefore 
undermining the lost evidence and quieting title rationales, will only 
happen in the rarest of cases where the true owner, sloth to respond 
to the open and notorious adverse possession over many years, will be 
inclined to seek compensation within a more limited period of time.  
 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1148. 
 180 Id. at 1149. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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Similarly, it is unlikely that the potential for compensation will create 
a disincentive for true owners to police their property, and therefore 
undermine the sleeping owner rationale, because the claim for 
compensation is confined to a narrow statutory period.  In any case, 
an owner who sleeps on his or her rights will be ousted from his or 
her land and barred from compensation. 
Most importantly, the compensation requirement does not 
jeopardize the government’s reliance interests in the property 
adversely possessed.  It is important to note that, although 
compelling when the adverse possessor is a private party, the four 
expressions of the reliance rationale do not apply with the same force 
when the state is the adverse possessor.  This leaves the compensation 
requirement little to undermine. 
The property as personhood notion is a particularly weak 
justification.  It is tough to envision how a political entity, such as a 
municipal board of electors, would need control over resources to 
“achieve proper self-development.”184  The preserving the peace 
rationale is an equally weak justification to stand on because violence 
may always result from one person’s attempt to recapture property 
from another.  While the potential for violence depends on the 
tendencies of the particular individual, it is less likely to occur when 
one is trying to recapture property from the state.  The state’s 
overwhelming superiority—embodied in the police power—would be 
a disincentive for either party to resort to violence. 
With respect to the third account, the state’s economic reliance 
is not as seriously imperiled here as it is with a private party.  The 
notion of sunk costs or quasi rents has no applicability when the state 
is the adverse possessor.  The accession doctrine, even in its harsh 
common law form, will not relegate the state to an inferior 
bargaining position.  The true owner will never hold the state “over a 
barrel”185 in future negotiations, because the state can always exercise 
the power of eminent domain.  Depending on the procedure in the 
particular jurisdiction, condemnation results in either a forced sale 
with the value of the land determined by the court or a supposed, 
voluntary sale in the shadow of the state’s ability to force a sale.186  In 
 
 184 Radin, supra note 158, at 957. 
 185 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1131. 
 186 Condemnation procedure actually puts the state in a superior bargaining 
position because the state can condemn the land, paying whatever amount of 
compensation it deems appropriate.  The condemnee could then appeal the amount 
of compensation.  Some states require pre-condemnation activity before the 
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either situation, the state will pay a fair price. 
The fourth account, the reliance interest of third parties who 
have changed their position based on the adverse possessor’s 
appearance as the owner of title, is the soundest of the four reliance 
rationales.  The economic reliance interest of third parties could be 
seriously undermined by the requirement of compensation if the 
state were unwilling or unable to pay.  Again however, inroads on the 
reliance rationale are curbed by the statute of limitations for 
compensation. 
IV. THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT EXEMPT FROM PAYING COMPENSATION 
BECAUSE ADVERSE POSSESSION IS NOT A BACKGROUND PRINCIPLE OF 
STATE PROPERTY LAW 
The Takings Clause is a fundamental limitation that protects 
against government overreaching on private property rights and it 
may not be excused by the common law doctrine of adverse 
possession.  The power of eminent domain plays a unique role in 
civilized government.  With this power, the government may coerce 
the transactions that are necessary to implement omnibus programs 
for the good of all and to avoid the obstacles typically associated with 
the commons, such as transaction costs, hold outs, and free riders.187  
The exercise of this power is limited by the Takings Clause, which 
ensures that private property is not taken for public use without just 
compensation.188 
Common law principles should not excuse the government from 
this limitation.  The government cannot trample upon the interests 
of a citizen that it was designed to protect, and then claim that the 
Takings Clause does not apply to it because the invasion exceeded 
 
condemnor can get judicial determination of the amount of compensation.  See, e.g., 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-1 et seq. (West 1997) (declaration of taking, deposit the 
estimated compensation with court, commissioners to determine compensation); 
N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 101 et seq. (McKinney 2002) (public hearing, appraisals, 
negotiations and offer); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 2805 et seq. (2003) (offer, public 
hearing, selectmen to determine just compensation).  Some states have “quick take” 
procedures that allow the condemnor to take title after giving notice to the 
condemnee and depositing compensation with the court.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 117.042 (West 1997); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 498-A:5 (2003). 
 187 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 5.  POSNER, supra note 142, at § 3.7.  Posner describes 
the classic example of a hold out–the landowner in the path of advancing railroad 
tracks.  Id.  Recognizing the high cost of abandoning or altering the course of the 
railroad after starting it, the landowner could hold out for a higher price.  Id.  The 
landowner could get much more for the land than it is worth.  Id. 
 188 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 5. 
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the prescriptive period.  To permit such a result misunderstands the 
very foundation of American government, the bedrock principle of 
which is to ensure the security of the people’s life, liberty, and 
property.189 
At first glance, it appears that the Supreme Court in Lucas has 
narrowed the reach of the Takings Clause by common law principles.  
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia laid down the second categorical 
rule on takings and the now famous “nuisance exception.”190  The 
Court held that a regulation that deprives the landowner of all 
economically beneficial use of the land requires compensation unless 
the restriction is one that the “background principles of the State’s 
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”191  
The idea is that the property owner may only suffer a confiscation of 
those interests that were part of his title to begin with.192 
This limitation on the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that 
private land may not be taken for public use without just 
compensation is consistent with the purpose of civil government—to 
protect established property interests and entitlements.193  For 
example, common law nuisance is grounded in the principle that no 
one has the right to use land in such a way as to injure that of 
another.194  The government need not compensate for regulations 
that purport to abate a nuisance because they are rightfully wielding 
their monopoly of force to protect and secure the interests of those 
individuals who would be affected by the impending nuisance.195 
 
 189 During the Constitutional Convention, Alexander Hamilton noted that, “one 
great object of Government is personal protection and the security of Property.”  
Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings 
Thesis “Goes Too Far,” 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 195 (1999) (quoting from 1 Records of 
the Federal Convention of 1787, at 302 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)); see also THE 
FEDERALIST No. 54, at 351 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton) (Robert 
Scigliano ed., 2000) (“Government is instituted no less for protection of the 
property, than of the persons, of individuals.”). 
 190 Justice Stevens actually coined the name of the exception.  See Lucas, 505 U.S. 
at 1067-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 191 Id. at 1029. 
 192 The government may “resist compensation only if the logically antecedent 
inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests 
were not part of his title to begin with.”  Id. at 1027 (emphasis added). 
 193 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 5. 
 194 The underlying principle for common law nuisance is the maxim, sic utere tuo 
ut alienum non laedas (meaning “so use your own as not to injure another’s 
property”).  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1690 (7th ed. 1999). 
 195 See Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 774 (Pa. 
2002) (noting that if the state can prove that surface coal mining within Watershed 
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The Lucas Court did not indicate what other background 
principles of state property law fall under this exception.196  Some 
courts have found that custom197 and public trust198 are such 
principles.  Therefore, a government regulation that restricted a 
private landowner’s rights would not be a compensable taking if the 
land was held in public trust or customary rights are implicated.  
Again, this limitation on the Fifth Amendment’s requirements is 
consistent with our government’s commissioned purpose to protect 
and secure existing property interests.  Such regulations do not 
require compensation because they protect land that the public has 
an established interest in from limitation by a private owner. 
It might be argued that adverse possession is one of these 
background principles of state property law.199  While the Court’s 
treatment of background principles has been too sparse to suggest 
the direction it will take in the future, it is unlikely that adverse 
possession will be found a background principle.200  Adverse 
 
area “would unreasonably interfere with the public right to unpolluted water” then 
the mining can be prohibited without compensation); State v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 
993, 1002 (Colo. 1995) (concluding that state nuisance law prohibited landowner 
from engaging in activities that would spread radioactive contamination and that 
state regulations to that effect did not constitute a taking). 
 196 For an academic discussion on this issue, see David L. Callies & J. David 
Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom 
and Public Trust “Exceptions” and the (Mis)Use of Investment-Backed Expectations, 36 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 339 (2002); David L. Callies, Custom and Public Trust: Background Principles 
of State Property Law?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003 (2000). 
 197 See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456-57 (Or. 1993) (holding 
landowner had no right to develop dry sand areas of beach because common law 
doctrine of custom protects the public’s use of these areas), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207 
(1994); David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial 
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996); Paul M. Sullivan, Customary Revolutions: The 
Law of Custom and the Conflict of Traditions in Hawaii, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 99 (1998). 
 198 See McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003) (holding 
landowner had no right to develop tidelands on his lots because the tidelands are 
public trust property under state control), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 466 (2003); Hope M. 
Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence?: 
The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier 
Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
 199 The State of Rhode Island raised this argument in district court.  Pascoag 
Reservoir & Dam, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 226.  Rejecting this argument, the court stated 
that the only application of the “background principles of state property law” have 
been to excuse compensation for regulatory takings.  Id.  Whether the Supreme 
Court would apply this exception to permanent physical occupations, such as adverse 
possession, is yet to be seen.  Id.  Cf. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 60 
Fed. Cl. 230, 239 (2004) (holding that the background principles exception applies 
to both regulatory and physical takings). 
 200 Background principles have only cropped up in three Supreme Court 
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possession, nuisance, custom, and public trust are similar in that they 
are all established common law doctrines.  But adverse possession 
differs from the other three, in that it impacts purely private interests.  
Protection of public rights is not in the calculus.201 
Common law principles should not abrogate a fundamental 
constitutional limitation.  One possible reading of Lucas suggests that 
the government should not get the benefit of these common law 
principles unless the result is consistent with the framework upon 
which our republic was founded.  The “background principles of 
state property law,” or “nuisance” exception, fits within this 
framework, with each instance emphasizing the protection of 
established property rights and entitlements.  To consider adverse 
possession as such a principle would be antithetic to this 
understanding of the role of government, permitting unrestrained 
confiscation by the government of the very private rights it was set to 
protect. 
CONCLUSION 
The sovereign’s respect for the property rights of its citizens is a 
pillar upon which this nation was formed.  The Framers recognized 
the inherent right of the sovereign to take land for public good, but 
limited such power by requiring that its use be only for a public 
purpose and that the landowner receive just compensation for the 
private rights confiscated.  To allow any intrusion upon this principle 
by virtue of the common law doctrine of adverse possession would be 
an impermissible expansion of the sovereign’s power. 
A government entity’s acquisition of land by adverse possession 
 
decisions.  Justice Scalia first coined the phrase in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.  Justice 
Scalia again took up the discussion on background principles of state property law in 
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).  In an opinion dissenting from 
the denial of certiorari, the Justice questioned whether the facts were such that the 
Supreme Court of Oregon could declare the requirements of custom were satisfied.  
Id. at 1212.  The Supreme Court of Oregon had found that the City’s denial of a 
permit to construct on beach lots was not an uncompensated taking under the Fifth 
Amendment because under the state’s law of custom, the proscribed interests were 
not part of the landowner’s title.  Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 
1993) (en banc).  Also, treatment of background principles briefly surfaced in Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 n.1 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (illustrating that the 
constitutional guarantee of the Fifth Amendment would offer no protection if the 
antecedent inquiry into state background principles ended with a final decision of 
the state’s highest court). 
 201 Considerations of public interest are essential to the doctrines of nuisance, 
custom, and public trust. 
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is a compensable taking.  The few state courts to hold to the contrary 
reasoned with a misplaced emphasis on Texaco v. Short and 
mechanically applied the adverse possession doctrine in a manner 
that blatantly ignores the constitutional implications of the state’s 
intrusion on private property—an action that falls within the purview 
of Loretto’s physical takings rule.  Requiring compensation will not 
undermine the four rationales for the doctrine of adverse possession 
or otherwise act as a sub silentio prohibition on adverse possession by 
the government.  The government’s power of eminent domain and 
the statute of limitations for the takings claim mitigate any potential 
harmful effects that compensation has on these rationales.  Finally, 
the government is not exempt from paying compensation because 
adverse possession is not a “background principle of state property 
law” as contemplated by the Court in Lucas. 
 
